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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which the positive relationship between personal
wealth and entry into entrepreneurship is due to ﬁnancing constraints. I exploit a tax
reform and use unique micro-data from Denmark to study how exogenous changes in the
cost of external ﬁnance shape both the probability of entering entrepreneurship and the
characteristics of those who become entrepreneurs. As expected, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimates show that the entry rates for individuals who faced an increase in the cost of
ﬁnance fell by 40% relative to those whose cost of external ﬁnance was unchanged. However,
while some of the fall in entry was due to less wealthy individuals with high human capital
(conﬁrming the presence of ﬁnancing constraints), the greatest relative decline in entry
came from individuals with lower human capital, many of whom were above median wealth.
This ﬁnding suggests that an important part of the positive relationship between personal
wealth and entrepreneurship may be driven by the fact that wealthy individuals with lower
ability can start new businesses because they are less likely to face the disciplining eﬀect
of external ﬁnance.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D31, H24, J24, M13.
Key Words: ﬁnancing constraints, entrepreneurship, entry.
∗I am grateful to Niels Westergård-Nielsen at the Center for Corporate Performance and Jesper Sørensen for
providing access to the data, and to the Kauﬀman Foundation for ﬁnancial support. I am also grateful to Peter
Birch Sørensen and Erik Rahn Jensen for helping me understand the tax reform, and to Peter Hougård Nielsen
for help with translation. This paper has beneﬁted from very helpful feedback from Thomas Astebro, Kevin
Boudreau, Serguey Braguinsky, Rodrigo Canales, John-Paul Ferguson, Bob Gibbons, Lars Bo Jeppesen, Simon
Johnson, Bill Kerr, Tarun Khanna, Nico Lacetera, Josh Lerner, Rafel Lucea, Annamaria Lusardi, Søren Bo
Nielsen, Søren Leth-Petersen, Antoinette Schoar, Jesper Sørensen, Tavneet Suri and Noam Wasserman, as well
as seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, University of Copenhagen, Columbia GSB, Fuqua School of Business,
Harvard Business School, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, MIT, NBER, Rotman
School of Business, UCLA and Wharton. All errors are my own.
11 Introduction
Entrepreneurs are, on average, signiﬁcantly more wealthy than those who work in paid employ-
ment. For example, Gentry and Hubbard (2004) ﬁnd that entrepreneurs comprise just under
9% of households in the US, but they hold 38% of household assets and 39% of the total net
worth. Not only are entrepreneurs more wealthy, but the wealthy are also more likely to become
entrepreneurs (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). This relationship be-
tween personal wealth and entry into entrepreneurship has long been seen as evidence of market
failure, where talented but less wealthy individuals are precluded from entrepreneurship because
they don’t have suﬃcient wealth to ﬁnance their new ventures (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994).
A more recent alternate view has suggested that the relationship between wealth and entre-
preneurship may in fact be due to omitted variables rather than market failure. For example,
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) argue that the preference for being an entrepreneur may be correlated
with wealth, leading to a spurious correlation between an individual’s wealth and her propensity
to become an entrepreneur. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) make a similar claim, ar-
guing that entrepreneurial choices may be driven more by preferences for risk (as in Khilstrom
and Laﬀont, 1979), or a preference for control over the strategic direction of their own ﬁrms (as
in Hamilton, 2000) than by market failure.
Understanding the extent to which the relationship between personal wealth and entrepre-
neurship is driven by market failure is not just of theoretical interest, but also has important
policy implications, given the number of government programs aiming to promote entrepreneur-
ial activity through ﬁnancial subsidies. The inferential challenge, however, lies in the fact that
one needs an exogenous change in the ﬁnancing environment for entrepreneurs that is unrelated
to both the opportunity cost of funding new projects and the characteristics of potential entre-
preneurs. Without such an exogenous change, one cannot distinguish the substantive eﬀect of
ﬁnancing constraints on entrepreneurship from other omitted variables that also aﬀect selection
into entrepreneurship. The approach used in the paper is to exploit a tax reform in Denmark
that reduced the ability to expense interest payments on debt and hence increased the de facto
cost of external debt ﬁnance for some individuals, while leaving the cost unchanged for others.
Using this reform as the source of exogenous variation in the ﬁnancing environment therefore
enables me to directly study how changes in the cost of external ﬁnance aﬀected selection into
entrepreneurship.
In addition, I depart from the prior literature that has looked only at rates of entry into
entrepreneurship to also examine the characteristics of individuals who choose to become entre-
preneurs. This approach allows me to explicitly distinguish the extent to which individuals’
decision to become an entrepreneur is associated with their wealth, as opposed to other factors
aﬀecting selection into entrepreneurship.
2I use a unique individual-level panel dataset for the analysis which is drawn from the Danish
tax registers and comprises annual observations on each legal resident of Denmark. The dataset
has detailed occupation codes that facilitate a very precise identiﬁcation of individuals who
are entrepreneurs. Further, the dataset spans the eighteen year period from 1980-1997 and has
detailed information on the demographic and ﬁnancial attributes of each individual. This allows
me to study observable diﬀerences between individuals who choose to select into entrepreneurship
as well as to construct accurate measures of each individual’s (unobserved) ﬁxed eﬀect, based on
their actual and predicted annual income in each year. I therefore also examine how unobserved
individual ability diﬀered for those who became entrepreneurs when the cost of external ﬁnance
was high, relative to when it was low.
Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates highlight that entry rates for those aﬀected by the reform
fell by 40% relative to those who did not face an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance. Inter-
estingly, however, two distinct groups of individuals were impacted by the increase in the cost of
ﬁnance. First, some less wealthy individuals with high human capital were less likely to become
entrepreneurs, particularly in industries that were more reliant on external ﬁnance. Although
this highlights the presence of ﬁnancing constraints in entrepreneurship, only 11% of the relative
fall in entry was due to this group. The greatest relative drop in entry came from individuals
with low human capital. In fact, just under half of the fall in entry was due to individuals with
low human capital, but who were above median wealth. This second ﬁnding suggests that an
important aspect of the correlation between personal wealth and entrepreneurship is driven by
the fact that wealthy, but lower ability individuals can start new businesses because they are
less likely to face the disciplining eﬀect of external ﬁnance.
The second ﬁnding also helps to shed light on the why already-wealthy individuals may be
sensitive to unexpected changes in their assets when starting new businesses (Hurst and Lusardi,
2004; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994). Windfall gains in assets, like the lower cost
of external ﬁnance, may facilitate the founding of lower growth-potential or ‘lifestyle’ ﬁrms. It
may also shed light on why the wealthiest individuals have been found to be relatively poor
entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hvide and Møen, 2007) and why wealthy entrepre-
neurial households seem to have an unusually low return on their private equity (Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002).
These results should also be of interest to policy makers. In particular, they should interest
policy makers relating the ﬁnancing environment for new ventures to entrepreneurial outcomes.
This study suggests that policy makers aiming to subsidize entrepreneurship using cheap credit
could also drive adverse selection among new entrants by encouraging those with a preference
for entrepreneurship (rather than only those who are credit constrained) to select into entrepre-
neurship. For example, the results suggest there may be a potential risk of ‘excess entry’ among
the wealthy if the hurdle rates to ﬁnance their new ventures are too low (de Meza 2002). In
addition, the results should be of interest to those thinking about the impact of tax policy on
3entrepreneurial outcomes (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000, 2004; Cullen and Gordon, 2002) and how
these policies can be used to impact both the characteristics of those becoming entrepreneurs
and the distribution of talent across occupations.
2 Financing Constraints and Entrepreneurship
Empirical tests of ﬁnancing constraints in entrepreneurship typically assume that individuals
are wealth maximizers and that they choose entrepreneurship over paid employment if it yields
the highest present value of future earnings. Let individual earnings for individual i in sector j
and year t be given by:
Yijt = fj(Hit,W it)+ ijt j = ENT,PE (1)
where Hit is a vector of observed individual productivity characteristics such as education and
job tenure, Wit is the individual’s personal wealth and the two sectors are entrepreneurship and
paid employment. Aside to contributing towards an individual’s non-salary income in a given
year, individual wealth may play an additional role in determining entrepreneurial income and
hence occupational choice: since new businesses require a capital investment, the returns from a
new venture can be expected to be an increasing function of the capital invested in the startup
up to an optimal level. If an individual does not face ﬁnancing constraints, then the amount
of capital that she invests in her business would be independent of her personal wealth. If
however, she did face ﬁnancing constraints, then the amount she invests would be based on
her personal wealth (less than the optimal level of capital), lowering her expected income from
entrepreneurship, and hence lowering the probability that she would leave paid employment to
become an entrepreneur.
The standard approach to testing credit constraints is therefore to run a probit model where
the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if an individual who is employed in one year becomes an
entrepreneur in the next. If the coeﬃcient on individuals’ personal wealth is positive, it suggests
that individuals may be credit constrained (Evans and Jovanovic,1989, Gentry and Hubbard,
2004).
Subsequent research has aimed to overcome two sources of spurious correlation in such an
empirical test. The ﬁrst relates to the endogeneity of wealth creation: if individuals with
low ability are less likely to generate savings and also less likely to become entrepreneurs, the
observed correlation between personal wealth and entrepreneurship may reﬂect this unobserved
attribute rather than the causal eﬀect of ﬁnancing constraints (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen, 1994). In order to control for such a spurious correlation, researchers have sought to ﬁnd
exogenous shocks to personal wealth and study their eﬀect on selection into entrepreneurship.
For example, Lindh and Ohlsson (1999) have shown that those who win lotteries are more likely
to be entrepreneurs than those who do not. A related approach has used inheritances as a source
4of unexpected liquidity that reduces potential ﬁnancing constraints (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen, 1994; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998). These studies also ﬁnd that unexpected shocks
to personal wealth lead to higher rates of entry into entrepreneurship.
A second source of spurious correlation arises from the fact that (observed and unobserved)
individual ability and preferences for entrepreneurship may be systematically correlated with
personal wealth. For example, wealthy people may have lower absolute risk aversion, making
them more likely to become entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic,1989; Khilstrom and Laﬀont,
1979), or they may have a preference for being their own boss that rises with wealth (Hurst and
Lusardi, 2004). Further, suppose that individuals have sector speciﬁc abilities so that:
 ijt = θij + ηijt j = ENT,PE (2)
In such a framework, if wealthier individuals are more productive as entrepreneurs than as
wage employees, say because they have access to better entrepreneurial opportunities or net-
works (Shane, 2000), they may be more likely to systematically sort into entrepreneurship than
those who are less wealthy. Each of these factors where personal wealth is systematically cor-
related with entrepreneurial ability or preferences would lead to a positive relationship between
individual wealth and entrepreneurship even if individuals faced an exogenous shock to personal
wealth. In fact, in an extreme case we may observe individual i becoming an entrepreneur even
when in pure income terms she is better oﬀ in wage employment. This argument has been put
forth by Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) to account for the fact
that in their samples, individuals seem to become, and remain entrepreneurs, even though their
income as entrepreneurs is below that of wage employees.12
2.1 Cost of External Finance and Selection into Entrepreneurship
The approach used in this paper to identify ﬁnancing constraints is to exploit a reform that
changed the ﬁnancing environment for new ventures, but did not directly aﬀect individual wealth
or the opportunity cost of capital for new projects. This approach to identifying ﬁnancing
constraints has the attractive property of allowing me to better-account for the second source of
spurious correlation outlined above.
Further, since, the reform changed ﬁnancing constraints without directly impact individuals’
wealth, it also allows me to explicitly examine the extent to which personal wealth, as opposed
to other factors is important for determining selection into entrepreneurship. In particular, I
focus on the extent to which human capital — rather than personal wealth — may be the basis of
1Although Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) do not ﬁnd entrepreneurial income to be below that of
wage employment, they argue that the income for entrepreneurial households that they observe is still below the
income premium one would expect them to have over wage employees holding public equity portfolios, given that
entrepreneurial households invest the vast majority of their wealth into a single business, thereby holding highly
concentrated, risky, and illiquid private equity portfolios.
2Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also point to this explanation in trying to reconcile the fact that in their sample,
very wealthy households show a strong positive relationship between wealth and entry into entrepreneurship,
while this relationship does not exist for less wealthy households.
5selection into entrepreneurship. To see why this might be the case, note that for a project with
a ﬁxed capital investment, or an environment where the returns to human capital are higher
in the entrepreneurship sector, individuals with higher human capital and ability will be more
likely to enter entrepreneurship. This implies that while one response of an increase in the cost
of ﬁnance could be a fall in the entry of those "marginal" individuals who have less capital,
another response might be the fall in entry of those who have lower human capital or lower
ability. While the former is an example of market failure as portrayed in the literature, the
latter is not. This study therefore helps to shed light on these two distinct selection mechanisms
that are harder to study when looking only at unexpected shocks to personal wealth.
2.2 Danish Tax Reform
The Danish tax reform of 1987 was part of a series of such tax reforms across OECD countries in
the mid-1980s, including the US reform of 1986.3 One of the important changes resulting from
the reform was the treatment of interest expense on personal debt. While the tax structure
prior to 1987 allowed individuals to expense interest on their personal debt at their marginal tax,
this provision was removed following the reform. Thus, while prior to 1987, someone in the top
tax bracket — whose marginal tax rate then was 73% — could deduct 73% of the interest expense
on their debt, the maximum they could deduct after 1987 was 52% (Hagen and Sørensen 1998;
Jensen 2002).
This change in policy related to expensing interest on personal debt would have been partic-
ularly hard for owners of unincorporated businesses, whose cost of external ﬁnancing increased
substantially following the reform. Recognizing this, the tax reform also included a special
provision for such entrepreneurs (known as the "company tax scheme") that allowed them to
continue expensing interest payments on debt related to their unincorporated business at their
marginal tax rate, as long as they could show — using additional accounting procedures — that the
debt was used for running the business. In practice, the company tax scheme was complicated
and poorly advertised, which meant that many entrepreneurs faced a de facto increase in the
cost of ﬁnance that was much larger. Note, however, that even those individuals who availed
of the company tax scheme faced an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance since the tax law
3Denmark’s tax reform of 1987 was the ﬁrst major tax reform in the country since the early 1900’s and was
part of a series of such reforms that took place across Scandinavia and many OECD countries over the late 1980s
and early 1990s, including the US tax reform of 1986. Following the reform in 1987, Denmark was the ﬁrst
Nordic country to move towards a system of ‘dual income taxation’, where capital and labor income are taxed
at separate rates rather than at the same rate as is done in the system of ‘global income taxation’. Although
ﬁrst introduced in Denmark in 1987, this feature was subsequently adopted by the other Nordic countries over
the next 5 years.
Denmark’s adoption of the dual income tax is credited to the eﬀorts of a Danish professor, Niels Christian
Nielsen who argued in favor of a ﬂat tax on capital income — that would be equal to the corporate tax rate —
combined with a progressive tax rate on the remaining (labor income) for an individual. Nielsen was a member
of the inﬂuential ‘Thorkil Kristensen Committee’ advising the government, as well as on a committee of tax
experts set up by the Danish Savings Bank Association in 1984 to study the Danish tax system and both of these
committees pushed for a series of tax reforms along the lines of the dual income tax (Sørensen, 1998). This led
to an agreement among the Danish political parties to change the tax system in late 1985, that took eﬀect as of
the beginning of 1987 and were phased in over the next two years.
6involved a fall in the national tax rates (although an increase in local government taxes implied
that the overall tax rate remained very similar).
Thus, while overall tax rates faced by the individuals remained roughly constant, potential
(and current) entrepreneurs faced a steep increase in their cost of external ﬁnance if they were
in one of the two higher income tax brackets. These details can be seen from the table below.
Highest Tax Bracket 
(80-100th Pctile      
in Income)
Middle Tax Bracket 
(40-80th Pctile       
in Income)
Lowest Tax Bracket 
(0-40th Pctile        
in Income)
Pre 1987 73% 62% 48%
Post 1987 52-69% 52-58% 52%
Interest Tax Shield on Debt
For example, an individual in the highest tax bracket who borrowed 10,000 Kroner at 10%
would have had an eﬀective interest rate of just 2.7%. This increased to an eﬀective interest
rate of between 3.1% and 4.8% following the reform, which implied an increase of between 10%
and 75% over the interest payments prior to the reform.
Since personal debt is used by the vast majority of entrepreneurs using external ﬁnance
(Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen 1998) and constitutes over 60% of the external ﬁnancing of new
ventures (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Black and Strahan, 2002), the change in the cost of debt
ﬁnancing serves as a useful way to study the extent to which the cost of external ﬁnance impacts
entry into entrepreneurship. Moreover, since individuals in two tax brackets faced an increase in
t h ec o s to fe x t e r n a lﬁnance but the third group did not, this facilitates a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
empirical speciﬁcation for my analysis.
3D a t a
3.1 Description of Data
I use a matched employer-employee panel dataset for this study that is a signiﬁcant improvement
over data used in most prior studies on ﬁnancing constraints. The data is drawn from the
Integrated Database for Labor Market Research in Denmark, which is maintained by the Danish
Government and is referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA. IDA has a number of features that
makes it very attractive for this study.
First, the data is collected from government registers on an annual basis, and has detailed
micro data on the labor market status of individuals, including their primary occupation. An
individual’s primary occupation in IDA is characterized by the fraction of income earned from
that occupation over the prior year. Individuals are therefore identiﬁed as business owners if
the majority of their income in that year came from their business. This allows me to identify
entrepreneurs in a much more precise manner than many prior studies. For example, I can
7distinguish the truly self-employed from those who are unemployed but may report themselves
as self-employed in surveys. I can also distinguish the self-employed from those who employ
others in their ﬁrm. Finally, since my deﬁnition of entrepreneurship is based on an individual’s
primary occupation code, I am also able to exclude part-time consultants and individuals who
may set up a side business in order to shelter taxes from my deﬁnition of entrepreneurship.
Second, the database is both comprehensive and longitudinal: all legal residents of Denmark
and every ﬁrm in Denmark is included in the database. In this extract, I have annual observations
on each individual for 18 years from 1980-1997. This is particularly useful in studying entry into
entrepreneurship where such transitions a rare event. It also allows me to control for many
sources of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level.
Third, the database links an individual’s ID with a range of other demographic characteristics
such as their age, educational qualiﬁcations, marital status, parents’ occupational codes, as well
as important ﬁnancial data, including annual salary income, total income, and the value of their
assets and debt. This facilitates a study of the basis of selection into entrepreneurship.
While there are several beneﬁts to using this data for my study, there may be concerns about
the external validity of a study that is based on information from a relatively small country such
as Denmark. I address some of these concerns in Table A1 in the Appendix — by looking at
how the rates of self-employment in Denmark compares to the US, and where available in other
European countries . Moreover, as I show later in the analysis, the concentration of wealth and
income among entrepreneurs is also present in Denmark, as it is in the US. These comparisons
should provide conﬁdence that the data I use has external validity beyond Denmark, at least to
other OECD and developed economies.
3.2 Deﬁnition of Entrepreneurship
There are two main types of individuals classiﬁed as business owners in IDA— those who are self
employed and those who are self employed with at least one employee. I focus the analysis on
individuals with at least one employee, as these are probably individuals who need to make more
capital investment in their businesses than those who are self employed. However, I do show in
several of the tables, that the results are robust to including individuals who are self-employed
without employees.
Id e ﬁne transitions to entrepreneurship as taking place when an individual who is employed
in a given year becomes an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. That is, I study transitions
to entrepreneurship when an individual is classiﬁed as being in paid employment in year t
and becomes an entrepreneur in year t+1. I therefore treat as censored, individuals who were
unemployed, students or self-employed in year t , but became employers in year t+1.
83.3 Sample used for the Analysis
One of the important factors predicting entry into entrepreneurship is individuals’ tenure at their
job. This information is not directly available in the IDA database, but given the panel structure
of the data, can be calculated from the dataset for those individuals who started a new job at the
beginning of any period. I therefore choose the sample for my study by taking all individuals
w h os w i t c h e di n t oan e wﬁrm in 1981. That is, I look at all individuals who were employed in
1981 but were not employed at the same ﬁrm in 1980. I then restrict this sample to include
individuals who are between 16 and 42 years of age in 1980, so that no individual in my sample is
younger than 16, or older than 60. Approximately 270,000 individuals (or 15% of all employed
individuals in 1981) met this criteria. I then created a panel dataset comprised of all these
individuals for the period 1981-1997. Note that since I am only interested in transitions from
employment to entrepreneurship, I exclude individuals in years in which they are unemployed,
or self employed. This subset of the main IDA database, with annual observations on each of
the individuals in the sample as above, forms the basis for my analysis.4
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
I report descriptive statistics on my sample in Table 1. Table 1 breaks down the sample by
those who transitioned to entrepreneurship in the following year, and those who did not. As
can be seen from Table 1, individuals who become entrepreneurs in the following year have 1.5
times the household assets than those who do not become entrepreneurs, and earn a third more.
Table 1 another aspect of the individuals who become entrepreneurs: They are more likely
to be employed as directors, or senior white collar employees in the year before they become
entrepreneurs compared to those who do not transition. Further, within the group of blue
collar workers, they are more likely to be skilled rather than unskilled workers. This suggests
that individuals with higher human capital are selecting into entrepreneurship, a fact that is
conﬁrmed later in the analysis. The probability that an individual who is employed becomes
an entrepreneur in the subsequent year is 0.35% for the overall population, but 0.58% for those
in the 80-100th percentile of income.5 This is consistent with prior studies looking at the
role of credit constraints that ﬁnd a positive relationship between wealth or income and rates of
entrepreneurship (Jovanovic and Evans, 1989; Hubbard and Gentry, 2004; Hurst and Lusardi,
4Note that since there is a concern that the results may be driven by the sampling strategy used for the
analysis, I also run robustness checks on the entry rate analyses (reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4) by creating a
repeated cross section by sampling 10% of the population in each year. The results are robust to this alternative
sampling approach. I also ﬁnd that number of switchers in my sample is representative of worker ﬂows in Denmark
in this period (Albaek and Sorensen 1998).
5These transition probabilities are smaller than those found in the US, where estimates from the Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) are around 4%. Part of this diﬀerence lies in the diﬀerence in
deﬁnition (if I include self-employed individuals, the transition probability in my sample rises to 1%). Part of the
diﬀerence also lies in the more stringent deﬁnition of those being classiﬁed as entrepreneurs in this dataset (only
those whose primary income is from their business), as well as the diﬀerence in register-based data compared to
survey data, where some unemployed individuals are likely to classify themselves as self-employed.
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4R e s u l t s
4.1 Relationship between Personal Wealth and Entrepreneurship
I ﬁrst explore the association between individual wealth and transition into entrepreneurship in
greater detail, by running logit models of transition into entrepreneurship. The basic estimation
is:
Pr(Eit+1 =1 )=FL(β0 + γiXit + φt + ψj + ϕc + ηo +  it) (3)
where Pr(Eit+1 =1 )is the probability that an individual who is employed in a given year
becomes an entrepreneur in the subsequent year conditional on right-hand-side variables, FL
is the cumulative logistic distribution function, Xit is a matrix of individual- and ﬁrm-level
control variables, and φt,ψ j,ϕ c,η o refer to year, industry, county and occupation-code ﬁxed
eﬀects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. I report the results
of equation (3) in Table 2. Model 1 shows that both higher personal assets and higher personal
debt are associated with subsequent entry into entrepreneurship. In model 2, I add other
ﬁnancial covariates and in model 3, a range of demographic and educational controls. The
coeﬃcients on personal assets and debt remain highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on logit
models facilitate a direct look at the economic magnitude of the coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient on
log assets implies that a 1% increase in log assets (approximately a 10% increase in assets at the
mean) implies a 8.7% increase in the odds of being an entrepreneur (exp(0.084)).6 Although all
the models include Industry (SIC1), Year, Region, and occupation code ﬁxed eﬀects, I also run
the regressions on a restricted set of industries (manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, and
services) to validate my results. These are not reported, but conﬁrm the same ﬁndings as model
3. Column 4 has the same model as column 3, but with a broader deﬁnition of entrepreneurship
that includes those who transition to self-employment in addition to those who transition to
becoming employers. Again, the results on personal wealth remain constant, although this
model highlights that the types of individuals becoming self employed are somewhat diﬀerent
than those becoming employers. They are less like to have university education, and less likely
to be in the highest income bucket. One concern with these results is that they may not apply
for the highly educated, potential technical entrepreneurs in the economy. To address this
concern, column 5 reports the results of the model run in Column 4, but restricting the sample
to individuals who had a university degree in 1981. Again, the value of an individuals’ household
assets is positively associated with the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.
6Note that the coeﬃcients on logit models can be interpreted as the log-odds of becoming an entrepreneur.
This is perhaps more intuitive than examining the marginal eﬀects since baseline odds of becoming an entrepreneur
are so low. As a comparison, the marginal eﬀect of a unit increase in log assets (computed at the mean) is 0.02%.
To put this in perspective, however, the predicted probability of entry is just over 0.2%, implying, as with the
odds ratio, that a 1% increase in log household assets increases the probability of entry by about 10%.
10As outlined above, one possibility for the association between wealth and entry reported
in Table 2 is that there is some unobserved individual attribute that makes some people more
likely to be wealthy and also be more likely to become entrepreneurs. To check this, I add in
individual ﬁxed eﬀects into the models. I report the results of these conditional ﬁxed eﬀects
logit models (i.e. individual ﬁxed eﬀects models) in Table 3. These models look at whether
there is an association between wealth and entrepreneurship even within individuals’ careers.7
As can be seen from the results in Table 3, the association between personal assets and entry
into entrepreneurship is present even within individuals’ careers, so that individuals are more
likely to transition into entrepreneurship when they have higher personal assets. As with Table
3, the coeﬃcients on personal assets are stable and consistently signiﬁcant across the diﬀerent
samples for which the models were run. As with Table 2, the results are shown to hold for the
broader deﬁnition of entrepreneurship, that includes self-employed individuals without employees
(column 4) and for individuals with greater human capital (column 5). One interesting point to
note is that while having a university degree was uncorrelated with entering entrepreneurship in
the cross section (and negatively associated with entry into self-employment), the individual ﬁxed
eﬀects models highlight that, in fact, getting a university degree is strongly positively associated
with becoming an entrepreneur and with becoming self-employed. Getting a university degree
increases the odds of becoming an entrepreneur by over 300%.
4.2 Diﬀerences-in Diﬀerences Estimates
Although these results so far strongly suggest that personal wealth is important for entering
entrepreneurship, there is still a chance that an omitted variable that is correlated with wealth
is driving the relationship, rather than wealth itself. I therefore move to a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences speciﬁcation, looking at the entry rates of those who faced an increase in the cost of
external ﬁnance relative to those who did not.8 The ﬁn d i n g sc a nbem o s te a s i l ys e e nb yl oo k i n ga t
Figure 1. Figure 1 reports the rates of entrepreneurship before and after the reform, normalizing
the entry rates to be the same in 1983. It shows that the entry rates for the lowest income
bracket remained relatively constant over the period (and, if anything, rose slightly following the
reform). On the other hand, entry rates for those in the two higher income brackets fell about
40% following the reform. The diﬀerential trends for these income brackets suggest that the cost
of external ﬁnance played a substantive role in impacting entry following the reform. However,
7These regressions only include individuals who transitioned into entrepreneurship at some point in the sample
period since including individual ﬁxed eﬀects requires variation in the dependent variable in order for the model
to be identiﬁed (and hence have a much smaller sample size).
8Since the cost of external ﬁnancing is based on income, and income is based on the cost of ﬁnancing, one
might imagine that entrepreneurs deliberately lower income in order to take advantage of a diﬀerent tax bracket.
I account for this possibility explicitly in my empirical strategy in that I do not use a regression discontinuity
design but instead choose income buckets that broadly correspond to the cut-oﬀs for the tax brackets. Given
that there are only three tax brackets, my assumption here is that the cost of strategically choosing income to
maximize the beneﬁts from the cost of external capital are only worthwhile for individuals on the margins of the
tax brackets but not for the vast majority of individuals I study.
11in order to control for covariates, I next estimate the full diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation
outlined below:
Pr(Eit+1 =1 ) = FL(β0 + β140-80PCTILEit + β280-100PCTILE it +
β3POST t ∗ 40-80PCTILEit + β4POSTt ∗ 80-100PCTILE it (4)
+γiXit + φt + ψj + ϕc + ηo +  it)
The variable POST is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 from 1987 onwards and zero
until 1986. 40-80 PCTILE and 80-100 PCTILE are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if
the individual is in one of the higher income brackets (aﬀected by the reform). The diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimate is identiﬁed by interacting the POST variable with the income bucket of
the individual in each year, to see how the propensity for entrepreneurship for individuals in the
higher income brackets changed in the post period relative to that of individuals in the lower
income brackets.9 The two coeﬃcients of interest therefore are β3 and β4, which report the entry
rates of individuals in the two higher income brackets in the post period, relative to the entry
rates of individuals in the lowest income bracket. As before, standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
Table 4 reports the results of these diﬀerences-in-dﬀerences regressions, controlling for co-
variates. Models 1 and 2 report the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates on entry using the more
conservative deﬁnition of entrepreneurship — that is only including business owners with at least
o n ee m p l o y e e . S i n c et h et w oh i g h e ri n c o m eg r o u p sf a c e da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec o s to fe x t e r n a l
ﬁnance due to the reform, we should expect them to have a fall in entry relative to the base
category, the 0-40 Percentile of Income. This is indeed the case. Column 1 reports results for
the full sample, including industry, year, region and occupation code ﬁxed eﬀects. The magni-
tude of coeﬃcients β3 and β4 imply that the odds of entering entrepreneurship for individuals
in these income groups fell 40-45% following the reform.
Column 2 reports results for just two years, one before and the other after the reform,
at similar points in the business cycle, to avoid concerns of standard errors being too small
due to serial correlation (Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan 2004). The results are robust to
this speciﬁcation. Columns 3 and 4 compare entrepreneurship in industries with a greater
dependence on external ﬁnance to those that rely less on external ﬁnance.10 As can be seen from
columns 3 and 4, the eﬀect is stronger for those entering industries that are more dependent of
external ﬁnance, but there is also a signiﬁcant eﬀect on industries that are less dependent on
external ﬁnance.
9Note that the POST dummy is fully absorbed in this speciﬁcation which includes year ﬁxed eﬀects.
10 In order to calculate this measure of external dependence, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to calculate a
measure of external ﬁnancial dependence of industries at the SIC2 level, using data on US public ﬁrms over the
period 1990-2000. I then map this measure of external dependence to the industry codes in the IDA dataset. An
industry is then classiﬁed as ﬁnancially dependent if industry has above median dependence on external ﬁnance.
12Finally, I investigate whether the eﬀect of the reform had a diﬀerential eﬀect on individuals
transitioning to entrepreneurship compared with other types of labor market transitions, using
a multinomial logit models. I report the results of the multinomial logit models in Appendix 2.
The multinomial logit models highlight that the results present for entry into entrepreneurship
are not secular trends impacting all forms of labor-market transitions, and in fact are unique to
those becoming entrepreneurs or self-employed. The base category in the multinomial regression
is individuals who remain in the same job as they were in the previous year. Column 1 reports
coeﬃcients for those who become entrepreneurs with at least one employee, Column 2 reports
the coeﬃcients for individuals who become self employed, and Column 3 reports the results for
individuals who switch jobs. Looking across the columns at the coeﬃcients on “POST X 40-80
PCTILE” and “POST X 80-100 PCTILE” shows that the eﬀect is strongly negative for those
who become employers, less strong for those who become self-employed, and in fact is positive for
those who switch jobs. In unreported regressions, I ﬁnd that these diﬀerences are accentuated
for industries that are more dependent on external ﬁnance (for example, the diﬀerence between
employers and self-employed is also signiﬁcant). These results suggest that the reform had an
impact on those occupations requiring investments, particularly in those industries dependent
on external ﬁnance.
4.3 Wealth vs. Human Capital as the basis for Selection into Entre-
preneurship
Although the results thus far indicate that changes in the cost of external ﬁn a n c eh a v eas u b -
stantive impact on entry into entrepreneurship, they do not shed light on the basis of selection
into entrepreneurship. In particular, they do not identify whether it is only the less wealthy
individuals who are the ones who are reacting to the change in external ﬁnance by cutting back
on entering into entrepreneurship. While prior studies have had to assume that it is the tal-
ented, less wealthy individuals who are precluded from becoming entrepreneurs due to ﬁnancing
c o n s t r a i n t s ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h ec h a n g ei nt h eﬁnancing constraint due to the reform did not di-
rectly aﬀect individuals’ personal wealth allows me to directly investigate the extent to which
personal wealth, as opposed to other factors was important for individuals’ decision to select
into entrepreneurship.11 In particular, I investigate the extent to which those who are most
impacted by the reform are those with high entrepreneurial ability, but with low wealth — that
is the type of people policy makers may be most concerned about in terms of a market failure.
I therefore proxy for entrepreneurial ability using three diﬀerent methods. First, I look
11The distinction between an individual’s income bracket and their wealth is important in this context. In
particular, if the correlation between the measure of income and wealth is very high, then the ability to distinguish
the role of wealth in the selection decision will be limited since in that case the wealthiest individuals would also
face the highest increases in the cost of ﬁnance. The correlation between an individual’s average assets and
average total income over the period 1981 to 1997 is about 50%. The correlation between an individual’s total
income and household assets is 35% and the correlation between their average income and their household assets
in 1981 is 24%. This allows me to separate the eﬀect of income from wealth and therefore to study how people
across wealth levels reacted to the diﬀerential change in the cost of ﬁnance (based on their income bracket).
13at an observable measure of human capital by grouping people on whether or not they have a
university degree. Second, I calculate their individual ﬁxed eﬀect from an income regression
spanning their earnings over an eighteen-year period, and use this ﬁxed eﬀect to proxy for their
ﬁxed unobserved individual ability. Finally, I account for self selection into entrepreneurship
based on sector-speciﬁc abilities (that is, where entrepreneurial ability is allowed to be diﬀerent
from ability in paid employment) by running Heckman selection models. Perhaps surprisingly,
each of these results suggests that in fact many of the individuals who were sensitive to changes
in the cost of ﬁnance were those with lower entrepreneurial ability, rather than those with just
low wealth.
4.3.1 Observable Measures of Human Capital
In order to examine the extent to which human capital played a role in the decision to select
into entrepreneurship, I bucket people based on their income bracket and whether they had a
university degree. For simplicity, I now treat individuals in the two higher income brackets
together. I therefore have four categorical variables deﬁning individuals based on whether or
not they had a university degree and whether or not they were in the income bracket that was
aﬀected by the reform. This allows me to estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Pr(Eit+1 =1 ) = FL(β0 + β1UNI-0-40it + β2UNI-40-100it + β3NOUNI-40-100it
+β4POST t ∗ UNI-0-40it + β5POSTt ∗ UNI-40-100it,
+β6POST t ∗ NOUNI-40-100it + γiXit + φt + ψj + ϕc + ηo +  it) (5)
where UNI characterizes individuals who have a university degree, NOUNI those who have no
university degree, 0-40 deﬁnes whether they were in the income bracket unaﬀected by the reform
and 40-100 deﬁnes whether they were in an income bracket that was aﬀected by the reform.
The omitted category is low wealth individuals without a university degree in the 0-40 income
percentile. Each of the three categorical variables is then interacted with the POST dummy.12
The main coeﬃcients of interest are β5 and β6. If human capital is important as a basis of
selection into entrepreneurship, the coeﬃcient on β6 should be more negative than that of β5.13
I run these regressions on the full sample, and then also on subgroups of individuals based on
their household wealth.
In order to look at household wealth in the selection decision, I segment individuals based
on whether they were above or below median household wealth. Two diﬀerent measures of
household wealth could be used here. The ﬁrst is where wealth is measured in the year prior
12Note that as before the year ﬁxed eﬀects fully absorb the post dummy.
13Note also that the coeﬃcient on β4 allows us to look at the extent to which the baseline comparison is
accurate. Since those in the 0-40 category were unaﬀected by the reform, we should not see a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence among the reaction of those with high versus low human capital in this group. Hence, the coeﬃcient
on β4 should be insigniﬁcant from zero.
14to their potential transition to entrepreneurship, that is where wealth is lagged one year. The
second is one in which they are segmented based on their household wealth in 1981. An
individual’s wealth in 1981 is correlated with their average wealth across the period at 75%,
making the results very similar using the two diﬀerent measures. To be conservative, however,
the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are based on measure where individuals are segmented on
their household wealth in 1981.
Using these two diﬀerent segmentations allows one to compare the extent to which wealth and
human capital are important in the selection decisions of individuals. In particular, if wealth is
an important basis of selection, we should see a decline in entry coming from individuals with
low wealth, regardless of their human capital. If ability is an important basis of selection, then
we should see a decline in entry coming from individuals with low ability regardless of their
wealth. It is of course possible, that they both matter, but diﬀerently for diﬀerent subgroups.
This is in fact what we see.
Table 5 reports the results of this estimation. Column 1 reports the results for the full
sample, Columns 2 and 3 compare those who are above median wealth to those who are below
median wealth, and columns 5 and 6 compare those working in ﬁnancially dependent industries
to those in less dependent industries. As can be seen from looking across the columns in Table
6, there is a consistent decline in entry among those without a university degree including those
who are above median wealth. The marginal eﬀects for the decline in entry are greater for
those who do not have a university degree compared to those with a university degree. For
example, even for those who are below median wealth, Wald tests reject the hypothesis that
the coeﬃcient on these individuals is the same as that on the individuals without a university
degree. I estimate the extent to which the fall in entry was due to each of the four buckets by
multiplying the number of individuals in each category over the post period by the imputed fall
in entry (based on the coeﬃcients β5 and β6 in columns 2 and 3). This calculation suggests
that about 11% of the total fall in entry was due to individuals with high human capital, but
low wealth, 38% was due to those with low wealth and low human capital, 4% was due to those
with high human capital and high wealth. The greatest share of the fall in entry (47%) came
from individuals with high wealth, but low human capital.
While individuals with a university degree faced lower declines, and in general were not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the reform, the decline among those with high human capital, but
low wealth came mainly from individuals entering industries dependent on external ﬁnance.
That is, less wealthy individuals with a university degree but entering industries less dependent
on external ﬁnance did not face the same decline in entry following the reform. Again, this
highlights that while the majority of those cutting back entry were low ability individuals, some
individuals with high human capital but low wealth were adversely aﬀected by the reform.
154.3.2 Unobserved Individual Ability
Much of individuals’ ability is unobserved. In order to capture an element of this unobserved
individual ability, I exploit the panel structure of the data, and the detailed individual-level
observable data to back out individual ﬁxed eﬀects from an income regression. Each individual’s
ﬁxed eﬀect is then used to serve as proxy for their unobserved ability. I ﬁrst run a ﬁxed eﬀects
regression of the form:
Yit = α + θi + γiXit +  it (6)
where Yit is each individual’s total income in year t and Xit is a matrix of observables, like those
used in the regressions in Table 2, including the full set of industry, year, region and occupation
code ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition to these, I include an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, θi. Each individual’s
estimated ﬁxed eﬀect can then be ‘backed’ out from the ﬁxed eﬀects regression shown in (6).
In Table 6, I report the results of individual ability proxied by these individual ﬁxed eﬀects
and categorized in the same manner as for the results reported in Table 5. That is, I categorize
individuals into two distinct groups based on whether they were above or below median ﬁxed
eﬀects. Each of these two categories is further split by the income group of that individual in
each year and interacted with the post period dummy, yielding the same estimation structure
outlined in equation (5). The only diﬀerence, however, is that those with high human capital as
deﬁned as those with high unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects, rather than those with a university degree.
The speciﬁcation is therefore:
Pr(Eit+1 =1 ) = FL(β0 + β1HIGH-0-40it + β2HIGH-40-100it + β3LOW-40-100it
+β4POST t ∗ HIGH-0-40it + β5POST t ∗ HIGH-40-100it
+β6POST t ∗ LOW-40-100it + γiXit + φt + ψj + ϕc + ηo +  it) (7)
Given the computational diﬃculty of estimating 270,000 ﬁxed eﬀects, I examine the role of
individual ﬁxed eﬀects within the group of individuals with high human capital — that is within
t h eg r o u po fi n d i v i d u a l sw h oh a dau n i v e r s i t yd e g r e ei n1 9 8 1 . T a b l e6r e p o r t st h er e s u l t s . N o t e
that this table also reports results for the broader deﬁnition of entrepreneurship that also includes
s e l f - e m p l o y m e n ts ot h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients can be estimated more precisely. The results using the
more narrow deﬁnition of entrepreneurship that only includes employers yields similar results,
but is less precisely estimated due to the small number of such individuals in the sample.14
It can be seen from Table 6 that the coeﬃcients follow a similar pattern to those in Table
5. It is the individuals with the low unobserved ability rather than those with the low wealth
14Two diﬀerent approaches were used to compute ﬁxed eﬀects for those who became entrepreneurs: including
the years in which they earned entrepreneurial income, and excluding those years. The ﬁxed eﬀect results
computed using these two diﬀerent approaches were correlated at 97%. The results reported in Table 7 include
income for those individuals in all years.
16who are most likely to reduce entry into entrepreneurship following the reform when ﬁnancing
constraints increased. Moreover, the eﬀect is stronger for those entering industries with a higher
dependence on external ﬁnance. In fact, in this estimation, the individuals with high ability
do not seem to be adversely aﬀe c t e db yt h er e f o r m ,e v e na m o n gt h o s ew h oa r eb e l o wm e d i a n
wealth.
4.3.3 Allowing for Heterogeneous, Sector-Speciﬁc Ability
One of the potential concerns with using individual ﬁxed eﬀects to account for unobserved ability
is that it does not account for sorting into entrepreneurship based on sector speciﬁca b i l i t i e s ,a si n
equation (2). Heckman selection models (Heckit models) explicitly account for this non-random
selection. I run the selection models separately for those in the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups
for both the pre-reform period and the post-reform period, using as my instrument the dummy
variable for whether an individual’s parents were entrepreneurs. These results are reported in
Table 7.
The coeﬃcient on the inverse mills ratio compares the returns for those who entered en-
trepreneurship with the expected returns for the individuals who did not select in (Hamilton
2000). Looking across the coeﬃcients on λ in the post period, one can see that the coeﬃcient
becomes signiﬁcantly positive in the post period for wealthy individuals following the reform,
while it becomes negative (though not signiﬁcant) for individuals who are less wealthy. Again,
these results are consistent with the results in the prior Tables — among the wealthy individuals,
the decline in entry among lower ability individuals implies that the quality of entrepreneurs
increased following the reform. Among less wealthy individuals, however, the negative sign
potentially suggests the presence of a constraint preventing talented individuals from becoming
entrepreneurs (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). These results are also consistent with a view
that there are two distinct subgroups aﬀected by the increase in the cost of capital. The ﬁrst
included some talented but less wealthy individuals who may have faced ﬁnancing constraints.
The second included lower ability individuals who entered because the cost of external ﬁnance
was low but who cut back when the cost of external ﬁnance increased.
4.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Business Cycle Eﬀects
A potential concern with the results are that they are driven by business cycle eﬀects. In
particular, the reduction in the ability to expense personal debt also meant that mortgage
payments increased dramatically, creating a reduction in the demand for large houses and hence
a sharp fall in the property prices, particularly at the high end. This fall in asset prices also
coincided with a recession that lasted from 1987 till 1991. I include year ﬁxed eﬀects in all
the speciﬁcations to control for year-speciﬁc ﬂuctuations in the business environment. Note
17also that period under study spans 1981 to 1996 which includes two and a half business cycles
(one prior to and another one and a half post the reform). In particular, the property prices
increased from 1992 onwards and in fact were higher in 1996 than they were in 1986 prior to the
crash in prices. These business cycle eﬀects do not completely explain the results as can be seen
clearly from Figure 1.
4.4.2 Was it a reduction in ‘Tax Dodging’?
Another concern with the results I have reported is that the tax reform may have also reduced
tax dodging, so that individuals who had an incentive to set up a ﬁrm to dodge taxes now
no longer needed to. It is unlikely that this is the case: prior to the reform, there was no
separation between taxation of unincorporated businesses and personal income, so there was
in fact no incentive for individuals to set up businesses speciﬁcally to dodge taxes on personal
income. The ability to take on business debt for example, did not add any beneﬁtf o ri n d i v i d u a l s
in terms of tax breaks. They could take the loan for their own consumption and get the same
tax shield on interest expense. Further, incorporating the company did not yield any beneﬁts
either.
Although there was still an incentive to set up a business to generate tax breaks or shelters
(such as a car for the business that could then be written oﬀ as business expense), these types of
‘tax shelter’ businesses are explicitly excluded from my analyses. I only include those individuals
whose primary source of income is from entrepreneurship, and further, those who have at least
one employee. This reduces the likelihood of individuals who ‘found a business on the side’ as
being classiﬁed as entrepreneurs.
4.4.3 Other Incentive changes due to the Tax Reform
It is possible that the change in the overall structure of the tax rates may have had alternative
incentive changes that impacted individuals in a manner similar to that of a ﬁnancing constraint.
For example, Carroll, Holtz-Eakin et al (2000) argue that an increase in tax rates should reduce
the propensity to become an entrepreneur because of the eﬀect on the cash ﬂow of businesses,
as well as the incentive to exert eﬀort as an entrepreneur. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) support
this view. It is unlikely that the tax rates had a direct impact on entrepreneurship because
overall tax rates remained roughly constant across this period due to increases in local taxes.
If anything, the results in this paper are counter to the predictions of Caroll, Holtz-Eakin et al
(2000) and Gentry and Hubbard (2000), highlighting that the role of ﬁnancing constraints in
this context is an important driver of entry into entrepreneurship.
Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon (2002) argue that in fact high marginal tax rates on
unincorporated businesses relative to the corporate tax rate may in fact increase entrepreneurial
activity. Their argument is that the high marginal tax rates on unincorporated businesses serve
as an insurance policy against business failure because they allow businesses to write oﬀ business
18losses against personal income in the event that they fail. They argue that the value of this
insurance increases as the wedge between personal tax rates and corporate tax rates increase,
and hence lower marginal tax rates may in fact dampen entrepreneurial activity. While the
overall entry rates are consistent with this mechanism, there was no increase in the founding of
incorporated businesses relative to unincorporated businesses across this period. Further, the
greater decreases in entry for those in industries more dependent on external ﬁnance (Table 4)
suggests that the eﬀect runs through an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance.
5 Conclusions
The relationship between individual wealth and entry into entrepreneurship has long been seen
as evidence that less wealthy individuals are precluded from entrepreneurship because they don’t
have suﬃcient private wealth to ﬁnance their new ventures. Recent research has challenged this
view, arguing that the relationship may not necessarily be a consequence of market failure.
In order to examine the extent to which personal wealth is a barrier to entrepreneurship, I
exploit a tax reform that changed the de facto cost of debt ﬁnance for potential entrepreneurs,
to see how this exogenous change in the cost of external ﬁnance impacted both the rate of entry
and the characteristics of individuals who chose to become entrepreneurs. This approach not
only helps to overcome potential omitted variables in studying entry rates of individuals, but
also allows me to explicitly examine the extent to which individuals with low wealth, as opposed
to other characteristics, are most aﬀected by the change in external ﬁnance.
I ﬁnd that entry fell for individuals who faced an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance due
to the tax reform, showing that in fact the cost of external ﬁnance plays a substantive role in
impacting entry into entrepreneurship. Two distinct subgroups of individuals were impacted
by the reform. First, some less wealthy individuals with high human capital were adversely
impacted by the reform, particularly in industries that relied more on external ﬁnance. This
subgroup highlights the presence of ﬁnancing constraints in entrepreneurship but accounted for
only 11% of the total relative decline in entrepreneurship. Just under half the decline in entry
came from wealthy individuals with low human capital who had chosen to enter when the cost
of external ﬁnance was low, but did not enter when the cost of ﬁnance increased. The increase
in the cost of capital due to the reform caused these marginal, lower-ability individuals to select
out of entrepreneurship.
These results have several important implications. First, they contribute to the current
literature on ﬁnancing constraints in entrepreneurship by providing direct evidence of an alter-
native mechanism through which individuals select into entrepreneurship. The results highlight
that the higher rates of entrepreneurship prior to the reform were driven in part by lower ability
individuals who could indulge their preference for entrepreneurship because the cost of external
ﬁnance was low. The increase in the cost of ﬁnance raised the hurdle of entry, leading lower
19ability individuals (rather than just lower wealth individuals) not to become entrepreneurs. This
result therefore supports the view that the relationship between individual wealth and entrepre-
neurship in advanced economies is driven at least in part by unobserved heterogeneity (in human
capital or individuals’ ability), rather than only due to talented, but less wealthy individuals
who are unable to access capital for new ventures.
Second, the results in this paper provide an alternative explanation for the strong positive
association between individual wealth and entrepreneurship among the very wealthy (Hurst and
Lusardi, 2004) and the ﬁnding that even wealthy individuals (with liquid assets well beyond the
needs to start a typical business) respond to unexpected increases in their assets by choosing to
become entrepreneurs (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994). While prior work has argued
that this ﬁnding was evidence of a lower bound for ﬁnancing constraints in entrepreneurship, the
results from this paper suggest that at least part of the entry in entrepreneurship following large
windfall gains for already wealthy individuals may be driven by the fact that theses individuals
can now undertake low value entrepreneurial ventures that they aspired to found but may not
have been able to ﬁnance before. This may also explain the strong positive association between
wealth and entrepreneurship in the cross section even among the top 5% of the wealth distribution
(Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) and is consistent with the ﬁnding that private equity returns seem
to be too low (Moskowitz and Vissing Jorgensen, 2002). It is also consistent with ﬁndings that
wealth and ability may be negatively correlated in certain populations (Jovanovic and Evans,
1989) and that returns to capital can be decreasing for the very wealthy (Hvide and Møen, 2007).
This result also has important implications for policy makers aiming to stimulate entrepre-
neurship by providing cheap credit for new ventures. A growing literature supports the view
that entrepreneurs are not only critical for their role in creating new markets, technologies and
products, but are equally important for their role in the process of “creative destruction” (King
and Levine, 1993a; 1993b; Kerr and Nanda, 2007). While these potential positive externalities
could justify a role for the government to stimulate entrepreneurship, the results from this paper
suggest that a simple scheme of providing cheap credit for new ventures may be misguided. In
particular, it may lead to adverse selection among entrepreneurs, where individuals who choose
to select into entrepreneurship based on these subsidies may not always be talented individuals
who lack funding for their ventures. A signiﬁcant portion might instead include individuals
with large non-pecuniary private beneﬁts from entrepreneurship, rather than the projects that
are typically seen as those that suﬀer from market failure (Scott Morton and Podolny, 1998).
Finally, the results in this paper highlights that the characteristics of entrepreneurs are
endogenous to the ﬁnancing environment and that there may be heterogeneity in the backgrounds
and motivations of those who do choose to select into entrepreneurship. This has important
implications for theoretical models of entrepreneurial choice, in particular for those who argue in
favor of an ‘entrepreneurial type’. It also suggests that making inferences about both the nature
of entrepreneurship and the characteristics of entrepreneurs across regions or countries based on
20cross-sectional analyses may lead to erroneous conclusions, especially if the regions have very
diﬀerent institutional environments.
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 Become Entrepreneurs 







Average Non Real Estate Household Assets (Constant USD) 120,432 72,693
Average Household Debt including mortgage (Constant USD) 110,293 58,963
Average Salary Income (Constant US Dollars) 31,438 27,644
Average Total Income (Constant US Dollars) 39,666 30,824
Demographics
Average Age 36.3 37.1
Fraction Female 0.25 0.47
Fraction Danish Citizens 0.97 0.97
Fraction Married 0.66 0.62
Fraction who have Children 0.65 0.58
Fraction whose parents were previously Entrepreneurs** 0.02 0.01
Highest Educational Degree
Compusory education 0.25 0.31
High school (vocational) 0.46 0.40
High school (academic) 0.03 0.04
University 0.26 0.25
Firm Size and Occpation Code in Which Employed
Average size of establishment where employed 2,306 4,447
Median size of establishment where employed 20 365
Fraction who are Directors or Top Managers 0.03 0.01
Fraction who are Senior White Collar Employees 0.21 0.11
Fraction who are Mid-Level White Collar Employees 0.16 0.17
Fraction who are Low-Level White Collar Employees 0.17 0.27
Fraction who are Blue Collar Tier 1 Employees 0.20 0.16
Fraction who are Blue Collar Tier 2 Employees 0.19 0.24
Fraction who are Other Employees 0.05 0.04
Industry in Which Employed
Work in Agriculture 0.05 0.02
Work in Manufacturing 0.14 0.19
Work in Construction 0.09 0.08
Work in Wholesale, Retail Trade 0.22 0.13
Work in Transport  0.07 0.06
Work in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 0.12 0.09
Work in Public or Private Services 0.27 0.39
** This variable takes a value of 1 if the individual's parents were entrepreneurs at any point between 1980 and 1982, but were NOT 
entrepreneurs in the year prior to the individual becoming an entrepreneur.  This prevents a potentially spurious link between parents' 
entrepreneurship and an individual's own propensity to become an entreprenuer being driven family succession
* The Sample was constructed by identifying all individuals who started a new job in 1981 between the ages of 15 and 45, and creating a panel 
dataset for these individuals for 15 years from 1982-1996 -- so that all individuals in the panel were between 15 and 60 over the entire sample 
period.  Descritive Statistics are reported over the cells in which these individuals were employed at a firm -- that is years in which they were self 
employed, unemployed, or students are excluded from this table
TABLE 1:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS*Column (3) 
including Self-
Employed
Column (4) only 
those with 
University Degree
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Household Assets 0.059** 0.062** 0.085** 0.063** 0.079**
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010)
Log Household Debt 0.080** 0.053** 0.041** 0.030** 0.018**
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
Log Salary Income -0.097** -0.061** -0.192** -0.147**
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
[40-80th Percentile of Total Income]=1 -0.253** -0.301** -0.427** -0.773**
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.023) (0.059)
[80-100th Percentile of Total Income]=1 0.330** 0.153** -0.266** -0.515**
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.028) (0.064)
Log Firmsize where currently employed -0.186** -0.174** -0.171**
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Tenure in Current Job (years) -0.149** -0.168** -0.209**
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Tenure in Current Job ^2 0.007** 0.006** 0.009**
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.058** 0.073** 0.206**
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.021)
Age ^ 2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002**
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.652** -0.740** -0.633**
  (0.030) (0.018) (0.038)
Danish Citizen -0.376** -0.299** -0.212**
  (0.056) (0.034) (0.066)
Married -0.069** -0.016 0.047
  (0.026) (0.016) (0.036)
Have Children 0.189** 0.091** -0.042
  (0.025) (0.015) (0.033)
Parents were previously Entrepreneurs
1 0.329** 0.362** 0.275**
  (0.064) (0.040) (0.090)
Highest Degree: Highschool (Vocational) 0.092** 0.118**
  (0.029) (0.017)
Highest Degree: Highschool (Academic) -0.194** -0.102**
  (0.061) (0.034)
Highest Degree: University -0.068 -0.131**
  (0.036) (0.024)
Constant -4.621** -4.426** -5.114** -3.226** -6.577**
 (0.142) (0.145) (0.272) (0.168) (0.468)
Log Likelihood -77700 -76300 -74100 -166000 -36000
R
2 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.10
Number of Observations 3,360,661 3,360,661 3,360,661 3,360,661 612,481
Number of Individuals 270,674 270,674 270,674 270,674 52,040
Number of Transitions 12,253 12,253 12,253 32,300 3,201
Standard Errors in parentheses (clustered by individual); Two-sided t-tests: * p<.05 ** p<.01
1:  This variable takes a value of 1 if the individual's parents were entrepreneurs in 1980 0r 1981, but were NOT entrepreneurs in 1982.  This accounts for a 
potentially spurious link between parents' entrepreneurship and an individual's own propensity to become an entreprenuer being driven family succession
Full Sample
TABLE 2 :  ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF ENTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Logit Regressions:  Dependent Variable=1 if Individual Transitions to Entrepreneurship
Notes: Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996.  The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the 
individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year.  All Models include Year Fixed Effects, Industry Fixed effects at the SIC 1 level, Region fixed effects 
for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark, Occupation fixed effects to control for 7 levels of seniority in the organization -- such as directors, senior 
managers, white and blue collar workers.
Coefficients on Logit Model Column (3) 
including Self 
Employment
Column (4) only 
those with University 
Degree
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Household Assets 0.109** 0.112** 0.094** 0.090** 0.040**
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019)
Log Household Debt 0.018** 0.009 0.014* 0.006 0.004
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
Log Salary Income -0.079** -0.132** -0.035 -0.153**
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.035)
Log Firmsize where currently employed -0.110** -0.070** -0.093**
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.016)
Tenure in Current Job (years) -0.032* 0.026 -0.172**
  (0.014) (0.028) (0.027)
Tenure in Current Job ^2 0.038** 0.091** 0.048**
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Married 0.209** 0.212** 0.112
  (0.049) (0.071) (0.109)
Have Children 0.385** 0.352** 0.413**
  (0.041) (0.061) (0.097)
Highest Degree: Highschool (Vocational) 0.752** 1.730**
  (0.183) (0.186)
Highest Degree: Highschool (Academic) -0.192 0.649
  (0.289) (0.395)
Highest Degree: University 1.281** 1.866**
  (0.235) (0.342)
Log Likelihood -24261 -24110 -22091 -7669 -4471
R2 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.24 0.12
Number of Observations 101,796 101,796 101,796 101,796 20,712
Standard Errors in parentheses (clustered by individual); Two-sided t-tests: * p<.05 ** p<.01
Because the models require variation in the dependent variable, individual fixed effects models can only be run on those individuals who eventually 
become entrepreneurs -- hence the number of observations in these models is significantly smaller; Also, since any variable that is correlated with 
time will perfectly predict entry (since for all of these individuals the period in which they enter into entrepreneurship is the last period in which they 
are observed) variables such as age are omitted; any variables that are fixed across individuals are also omitted as they are absorbed in the 
individual fixed effect.
Full Sample
TABLE 3 :  PROBABILITY OF ENTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP: INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS
Notes: Models (3) and (4) are robstness checks using alternate definitions of entrepreneurship that includes both employers and self-employed 
individuals. Model (5) restricts the sample to individuals who had a university degree in 1981.  
Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Models:  Regressions include all Individuals in the sample who were employed between 1981 and 1996.  The 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the individual became an entrepreneur in the subsequent year. Note that the sample is a panel but not all 
individuals are included in the regression in each year since I only include those who are employed at a firm in any given year. Industry Fixed effects 
at the SIC 1 level; Region fixed effects control for each of 16 'Amts' or counties in Denmark; Occupation fixed effects control for the level of seniority 
in the organization -- such as directors, senior managers, white and blue collar workers.
Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Regressions.  Dependent Variable=1 if Individual Transitions to Entrepreneurship
Coefficients on Conditional Fixed Effects Logit ModelF
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c
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i
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c
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i
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i
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h
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c
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c
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u
d
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i
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d
r
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i
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p
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b
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b
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.
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u
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h
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.
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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i
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D
e
n
m
a
r
k
;
 
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
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v
e
l
 
o
f
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n
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r
i
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n
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r
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c
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r
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h
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e
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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.
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.
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c
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c
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i
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i
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R
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p
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n
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r
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b
l
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g
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t
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l
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n
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1
9
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v
e
 
M
e
d
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n
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e
a
l
t
h
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e
d
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l
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h
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u
l
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m
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c
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l
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c
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c
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λ
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n
d
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v
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a
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n
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n
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r
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r
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n
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u
r
s
h
i
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S
e
c
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r
(
2
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7
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0
.
4
0
1
0
.
9
5
-
1
.
1
2
0
0
.
2
4
4
-
0
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1
3
5
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
 
T
w
o
 
S
t
e
p
 
M
o
d
e
l
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h
e
r
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h
e
 
f
i
r
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t
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t
e
p
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p
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e
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r
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c
t
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n
g
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n
t
r
y
 
i
n
t
o
 
e
n
t
r
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r
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n
e
u
r
s
h
i
p
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
s
t
e
p
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
o
r
s
 
p
l
u
s
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
v
e
r
s
e
 
M
i
l
l
s
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
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t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
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t
a
g
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r
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c
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.
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c
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p
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p
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.
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.
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.
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.
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c
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c
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c
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.
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p
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p
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p
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P
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R
O
S
S
 
S
E
L
E
C
T
 
O
E
C
D
 
C
O
U
N
T
R
I
E
SV
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
B
e
c
o
m
e
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
[
1
]
B
e
c
o
m
e
 
S
e
l
f
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
[
2
]
M
o
v
e
 
J
o
b
s
 
[
3
]
[
4
0
-
8
0
t
h
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
]
=
1
-
0
.
1
5
4
-
0
.
1
4
9
*
*
-
0
.
1
2
4
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
7
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
[
8
0
-
1
0
0
t
h
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
 
o
f
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
]
=
1
0
.
4
1
7
*
-
0
.
3
3
0
*
*
-
0
.
2
1
1
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
7
9
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
1
)
P
o
s
t
 
x
 
4
0
-
8
0
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
4
7
4
*
*
-
0
.
4
4
6
*
*
0
.
0
7
0
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
8
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
1
0
)
P
o
s
t
 
x
 
8
0
-
1
0
0
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
-
0
.
3
6
8
*
-
0
.
1
9
2
*
*
0
.
1
2
2
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
8
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
1
)
L
o
g
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
A
s
s
e
t
s
0
.
0
6
5
*
*
0
.
0
3
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
2
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
L
o
g
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
D
e
b
t
0
.
0
4
4
*
*
0
.
0
2
9
*
*
0
.
0
0
9
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
L
o
g
 
S
a
l
a
r
y
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
-
0
.
2
5
7
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
4
*
*
-
0
.
3
5
1
*
*
 
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
L
o
g
 
L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
-
1
8
3
0
0
0
-
1
8
3
0
0
0
-
1
8
3
0
0
0
R
2
0
.
2
1
0
.
2
1
0
.
2
1
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
,
3
6
0
,
6
6
1
3
,
3
6
0
,
6
6
1
3
,
3
6
0
,
6
6
1
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
E
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
(
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
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c
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i
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i
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a
g
e
r
s
,
 
w
h
i
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
b
l
u
e
 
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
 
N
o
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
P
O
S
T
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
o
m
i
t
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
b
l
e
s
T
-
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
P
O
S
T
 
X
 
8
0
-
1
0
0
 
P
C
T
I
L
E
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
[
1
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
2
]
,
 
[
1
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
3
]
,
 
a
n
d
 
[
2
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
3
]
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
l
l
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
5
%
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
 
T
-
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
P
O
S
T
 
X
 
4
0
-
8
0
 
P
C
T
I
L
E
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
[
1
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
3
]
,
 
a
n
d
 
[
2
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
3
]
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
l
l
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
5
%
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
A
P
P
E
N
D
I
X
 
2
 
:
 
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
O
F
 
E
N
T
E
R
I
N
G
 
E
N
T
R
E
P
R
E
N
E
U
R
S
H
I
P
:
 
M
U
L
T
I
N
O
M
I
A
L
 
L
O
G
I
T
 
D
I
F
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
S
-
I
N
-
D
I
F
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
S
 
E
S
T
I
M
A
T
E
S
M
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
L
o
g
i
t
 
M
o
d
e
l
s
:
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
l
l
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
1
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
6
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
a
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
e
c
a
m
e
 
a
n
 
e
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
2
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
y
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 
s
e
l
f
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
3
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
y
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
e
d
 
j
o
b
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
(
0
)
,
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
w
h
o
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
j
o
b
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
 
(
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
o
r
 
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
a
r
e
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
o
m
e
w
h
a
t
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
)
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
M
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
L
o
g
i
t
 
M
o
d
e
l
M
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
L
o
g
i
t
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
:
 
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
=
 
{
1
,
 
2
 
o
r
 
3
}
 
a
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
b
e
l
o
w